A Trend Toward Strengthening Antitrust Sanctions by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 37 | Issue 4 Article 4
Summer 1962
A Trend Toward Strengthening Antitrust Sanctions
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1962) "A Trend Toward Strengthening Antitrust Sanctions," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 37: Iss. 4, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol37/iss4/4
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ployment laws without creating a burden on commerce or a conflict with
federal standards and will provide a constitutional application of these
laws to interstate carriers.
A TREND TOWARD STRENGTHENING ANTITRUST
SANCTIONS
Antitrust laws are normally enforced through sanctions imposed
in criminal prosecutions and civil treble damage actions.1 The burden
of deterring antitrust violations, however, seems to rest more on the
civil action instituted by private individuals than on the penal sanctions
of the antitrust laws.
In the civil action the plaintiff's problem lies in the obstacles which
must be overcome in proving (1) that there was a violation of the anti-
trust law,2 (2) that the plaintiff was injured in his "business or prop-
erty"' and (3) that the violation was the cause of the injury.' A review
of cases involving actions for treble damages reveals a tendency to lessen
the burdens in establishing the grounds for recovery of damages, thereby
providing a more effective sanction against violators. Although a majority
of the courts hold that the remedy provided by the Clayton Act is merely
compensatory,5 it is clear that the courts are aware of the deterrent affect
of trebling a "compensatory" award.'
In view of various problems created by the use of private civil actions
as a means of enforcing the antitrust laws, legislative attention has
recently been directed toward bringing up to date the penal sanctions of
the antitrust laws in order to make them more effective. This note will
demonstrate that the courts have decreased the burdens that a plaintiff
1. See OPPENHEim, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS CASES AND COMIENTS, 22-25 (2
Ed. 1959) for a general discussion of other remedies available under the antitrust laws.
2. See Comment, 18 U. Cxi. L. REv. 130 (1950) for a discussion of the obstacles
to the treble damage action.
3. Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Coal Co., 72 F.2d 885, 887 (4th Cir. 1934). "In a
civil suit under this section, the gist of the action is not merely the unlawful conspiracy
or . . . attempt to monopolize . . . but is damage to the individual plaintiff resulting
proximately from the acts of the defendant which constitutes a violation."
4. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944).
5. Karseal-Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Paramount
Films Dist. Co. v. Applebaum, 217 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1954); Wolf Sales Co. v.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Colo. 1952).
6. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957). The court stated
that the private treble damage action was an important means in helping to combat unlaw-
ful business practices. See also, Franchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp.
84 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
NOTES
must overcome in a civil action and will discuss the present and proposed
penal sanctions, pointing up the present trend toward making the anti-
trust laws more effective.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS WHICH HAVE LESSENED PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN
Proof of Damages. A comparison of early antitrust decisions with
more recent cases indicates the willingness of the courts to make it easier
for a plaintiff to recover damages. In 1924 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.7 in answer to a
respondent's contention that the damages suffered by the plaintiff were
merely speculative, stated that it was the tendency of the courts to find
some way in which damages could be awarded where a wrong had been
done. The court concluded that recovery of damages is properly denied
when there is merely speculation as to whether the defendant actually
caused an injury to the plaintiff, but when the fact of injury is established,
the courts do not deny recovery simply because it is difficult to ascertain
the exact amount of damages.
Although the courts generally require certainty in proof of damages,
modifications have been accepted which allow the courts to mitigate the
severity of the certainty doctrine. For example, in some instances the
difficulty in accurately determining the plaintiff's damages stems from
the defendant's illegal conduct. Here the courts refuse to listen to a
defendant's assertion that the damages cannot be accurately shown,8
just as it would be improper in a breach of contract action to allow the
breaching party to insist on proof which his very breach has made
impossible to secure.
The certainty doctrine was further modified in an action resulting
from an unlawful conspiracy to monopolize interstate commerce and trade
in the vegetable parchment industry. In Story Parchment Co. v. Patter-
son Parchment Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
reversed a judgment in favor of the petitioner, holding that the evidence
of damages was mere speculation and conjecture. The Supreme Court
reversed, saying that although there was uncertainty as to the extent of
damages, there was no uncertainty as to the fact of damages.1" Thus it
7. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 191 (2d Cir. 1924).
8. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
In discussing the requirement that damages be certain, the Supreme Court stated: "A
defendant whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the
precise damages suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot
be measured with the same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible."
9. 282 U.S. 555 (1931). The court allowed the jury to infer the amount of damages
from the facts and circumstances of the case.
10. Id. at 562.
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can be seen that a plaintiff can prove the amount of his loss by a just
dnd reasonable inference. This supports the Straus case, showing the
willingness of the courts to find some basis for allowing a recovery if the
injury is clear. The Court in Story further exhibited its lenient attitude
by generalizing that the "best available evidence" obtainable under the
circumsfances was sufficient.'
Another case allowing recovery on the basis of an inferential proof
of loss was Bigelow v. R.K.O.-Radio Pictures, Inc." involving a con-
spiracy to prevent the plaintiff from showing films in his theatres until
the defendant had shown them first. The Supreme Court held that a
comparison of the plaintiff's admission receipts before and after the
defendant's unlawful action against the plaintiff's business afforded a
sufficient basis for the jury's computation of damages.
When a violation and injury have been shown, these modifications
of the standard of certainty required in proof of damages relieve the
-plaintiff of burdens which might prevent recovery due to the complex
nature of antitrust violations.
Defenses. Earlier it might have been argued that "pari delicto"
and "unclean hands" defenses would preclude a plaintiff from recovering
for a violation of the antitrust laws.' The courts agreed that a party
"in pari delicto" could not seek redress.' Recent decisions, however, have
aided the plaintiff's cause by practically eliminating these defenses. The
Supreme Court in Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagrarns & Son 5 upheld a trial
court's instruction that a liquor wholesaler's agreement with other dealers
in a conspiracy to fix minimum prices would not constitute a defense to
the wholesaler's action for treble damages against the distillers, for illegal
conduct of the plaintiff could not legalize the conduct of the defendants
nor grant them immunity.
Also, in an action 6 for treble damages and injunctive relief under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the defendant publishing companies
pleaded affirmative defenses, alleging that the plaintiff, a wholesale
11. Id. at 565.
12. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
13. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694 (2d Cir. 1921). The court
held that a plaintiff could not recover for damages allegedly suffered during the
period of time in which it had been participating in the wrongful act.
14. Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, 253 (1871). The court said: "The general
principle is undoubted that courts of justice will not assist a person who has participated
-in a transaction forbidden by statute to assert rights growing out of it, or to relieve
himself from the consequences of his own illegal acts."
.15. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
16. Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952),
citing as authority: Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagrams & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1951).
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distributor of magazines in the New York area, had acquired a monopoly
and was therefore barred by "unclean hands" from seeking relief against
the defendants. In striking the affirmative defenses in accordance with
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the court said that
recent cases have greatly limited the "pari delicto" and "unclean hands"
defenses, if not completely abolishing them.
Judicial Interpretation. The plaintiff has also been aided by the
court's interpretation of the Clayton Act that the remedy of a treble
damage action applies to persons who have been prevented from engaging
in business because of a violation of the antitrust laws.' In several cases,
however, a plaintiff seeking to enter into business has been denied re-
covery, but usually on some other grounds.'" In one case the court applied
the doctrine that "he who is prevented from embarking in a new business
can recover no profits" in denying recovery.' 9 However, in that case the
plaintiff had been in business for several years but had never made a
profit, and the court thought the estimate of damages was too speculative.
A recent district court decision upheld the right of a person who had
been prevented from engaging in business to maintain an action, but
directed a verdict for the defendant on the grounds of insufficient
evidence.2" Thus it can be concluded that a person who has demonstrated
an intent coupled with an actual preparedness to enter into business can
maintain an action, but he will have a difficult time in recovering where
he cannot clearly prove damages.
Procedural Aid. The courts have afforded the plaintiff several
procedural aids. For example, the Clayton Act contains its own venue
provision in section 12,21 which the Supreme Court held must be construed
with section 4 in determining the proper venue for a treble damage action.
When these sections are read together the plaintiff may bring an action
not only where the defendant is "found," but, also, wherever the de-
fendant is "transacting business."22 In addition, one court shifted the
17. Tomsen v. Union Castle Mail Steamship Co., 166 Fed. 251 (2d Cir. 1908).
18. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., Inc. v. National Electric Products Corp., 152 F.2d
308 (3rd Cir. 1945). Recovery was denied the plaintiff because he did not allege that
he had "intended" to go into the business of producing bushings "commercially."
19. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Company of America, 79 F.2d 217(2d Cir. 1935); See also, Donovan, Proof of Damages Under the Antitrust Law,
88 U. PA. L. REV. 511, 522 (1940) for a discussion of cases dealing with prevention
from entering business and the certainty requirements for damages.
20. Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp.
440 (E.D.Pa. 1960).
21. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
22. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 359, 374 (1927).
The Supreme Court said: "To construe the words 'or transact business' as adding
nothing of substance to the words 'is found' . . . would to that extent defeat the plain
purpose of this section § 12 Clayton Act]."
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burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant when the plain-
tiff established facts giving rise to an inference of a violation.23
The Culmination of the Trend. From a pattern of relatively moder-
ate judicial expansion, a federal court in Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe
Machinery Co.24 recently moved to the extreme position of granting a
plaintiff recovery when he appeared to have passed the loss on to his
customers in the form of higher prices, although prior courts seemed
to agree that a plaintiff could not recover in such circumstances." The
Hanover Shoe Company brought the action to recover treble damages
alleging that the defendant unlawfully controlled the market in the field
of shoe machinery rental.26 The trial court ordered a special trial, with
the agreement of both parties, to determine if the plaintiff had been
"injured" as defined by section 4 of the Clayton Act.2" In finding for the
plaintiff, the court seemed to base its reasoning on two conflicting
theories, one of which indicates that the defense of "passing on" does
not exist in law, the other seeming to recognize the defense but limiting
its application.
In regard to the first theory advanced, the court stated that this
case called for a straight application of tort law and that the "excessive
price was the injury."2 The court said also that an actionable injury
occurs at the exact moment that an over-charge is made through monopo-
listic practices, and that any subsequent shifting of the loss has no
effect on the plaintiff's right to recovery. The widespread application
of this theory could lead to several suits to recover the same damages
where they have been passed on "down the line." This theory also gives
rise to another area of disagreement in civil antitrust actions-i.e.,
whether a treble damage action is in tort29 or some other type of action.
In Philco Corp. v. RCA"0 it was recently held that an antitrust action was
23. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 150 F.2d 738, 743 (3rd Cir.
1945). In discussing the plaintiff's proof the court said: "When the proof supported,
as we think it did, the inference of such concert, the burden rested on the [defendant]
of going forward with the evidence to explain away or contradict it."
24. 185 F. Supp. 826 (M.D.Pa.), afrd, 281 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 901 (1960).
25. Volfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 915 (1955) ; Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945).
26. Plaintiff relied on a decree rendered against United Shoe Machinery Co. in an
earlier prosecution by the United States in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1953).
27. This separate trial was based on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(b) and proceeded
upon two assumptions: "(1) that the violation of law existed, and (2) that the excessive
cost of shoe machinery as alleged existed." Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery
Co. 185 F. Supp. 826, 828 (M.D. Pa. 1960).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. 186 F. Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa. 1960).
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a creature of statute, unknown at common law, and that it was improper
to indiscriminately apply common law tort concepts.
The reasoning behind the Hanover decision becomes less clear, how-
ever, when the court discusses the defendant's contention that the pre-
cedents in the "oil jobber" cases should govern.3 ' In those cases civil
actions were initiated against several oil companies which had been
convicted in a previous government action for conspiring to raise the
market price of gasoline in the Midwest. Recovery was denied on the
grounds that the plaintiffs were unable to prove that they had suffered
a loss, as they had passed on their loss in higher prices. The plaintiff
in the Hanover case argued that its case could be distinguished from the
"oil jobber" cases because those cases involved "middlemen" buying
bulk oil and reselling the oil to their consumers, whereas the plaintiff
was himself a "consumer" of the leased machinery. There is no doubt
from the language of the court in the "oil jobber" cases that "passing on"
was recognized as a valid defense. The problem raised by the Hanover
opinion is the extent to which this defense has been limited or excluded,
and whether or not the consumer-middleman classification is too uncertain
to be a satisfactory test for granting or denying relief in a treble damage
action.
This "consumer-middleman" distinction is novel in its application to
antitrust actions. The normal concept of a "consumer" is one who uses
economic goods and thereby destroys their utility. 2 It is true that the
plaintiff in Hanover was the sole user of the leased shoe machinery,
whereas the "oil jobbers" did redistribute the gasoline after they had
acquired and stored it for a period of time. But it does not follow that
this distinction is sufficient to prevent the application of the defense
of "passed on" costs. Both the "oil jobbers" and the Hanover Company
performed an intermediate service which was then furnished to an ulti-
mate consumer; Hanover by selling finished shoes to its customers and
the "oil jobbers" by distributing gasoline to other dealers. Although
the increased costs to the Hanover Company were in the form of higher
rental rates on the leased shoe machinery, this did not prevent them from
charging their customers a proportionately higher price for the finished
shoes. The distinction of a middleman as opposed to a consumer should
31. Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.) cert. detied,
326 U.S. 734 (1945) ; Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co.,
119 F.2d 847 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941). For an analysis of the earlier
decisions involving oil jobbers see Comment, 70 YALE L.. 469, 470-477 (1961).
32. Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commissioners, 110 Utah 135, 170
P.2d 164 (1946) ; St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. State, 40 Wash. 2d 347, 243 P.2d
474 (1952).
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not be the controlling factor in a case such as Hanover; rather the real
issue should be a question of fact as to whether a company actually
sustained a loss, or whether it in fact passed the loss on to its customers.
The use of a consumer-middleman distinction seems to be a rather
indefinite classification in that the technical use of the term "consume"
implies that the cost could not be passed on, or in the alternative, a person
who is able to pass on the product and increased cost cannot be a con-
sumer. It seems that the Hanover court's definition has introduced a new
meaning in the term "consumer."
Pointing up the logical problems in the district court opinion, counsel
for United Shoe Machinery Corporation argued on appeal that the find-
ing of the court was erroneous because, "(1) It ignores the statutory re-
quirement that a plaintiff show he was injured in his business or property
and the explicit limitation on the recovery of such a plaintiff to 'threefold
the damages by him sustained'."3 The appellant's arguments were re-
jected in a per curiam decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, which said that the district court's opinion was thoroughly
convincing."' The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari. 5
Since there are two apparently conflicting theories, the problem
remains to determine the actual theory upon which relief was granted
in the Hanover case, although neither can be relegated to the category of
obiter dictum."
The problem is made more acute because of the impact of the
Hanover decision on pending and future litigation, as it could result in
financial disaster for many offenders. For example, a joint suit has
li5en filed by the United States and the Tennessee Valley Authority to
recover more than $12 million in damages from five manufacturers of
heavy electrical equipment.3 A multitude of suits could arise whereby
each party in succession might bring an action for excessive charges."
For example, what if a manufacturer caused a discriminatory overcharge
to be placed on a wholesaler, who in turn raised his prices to a retailer in
order to cover the increase, and the retailer then raised the price charged
33. Brief for Appellant pp. 6-7, Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
281 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1960).
34. Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 281 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1960).
35. Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 364 U.S. 901 (1960).
36. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
37. United States & T.V.A. v. General Electric Co., civ. #29379 filed 14 March
1961. The United States government cannot recover treble damages; and query as to the
official status of the Tennssee Valley Authority.
38. Brief for Appellant, pp. 19-20, Hanover Shoe Co. v. United Shoe Machinery
Co., 281 F.2d 481 (3rd Cir. 1960).
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to a consumer? It appears that the wholesaler, retailer and consumer,
in separate actions, could recover for this same overcharge in light of the
Hanover decision. It seems unlikely that this is the result intended by the
courts or the legislature.
The district court's opinion in the Hanover case is a result of the
trend toward making the private action for treble damages a more
effective device for deterring violations of the antitrust laws. Thus the
result is based on policy considerations, not the rather strained theories
of the court. In light of numerous earlier decisions and a recent district
court decision,39 the soundness of the legal reasoning of the district court
in Hanover can be questioned.
The Prima Facie Case. Section 5 of the Clayton Act allows final
judgments rendered in a government antitrust action against the same
defendants to be entered as prima facie evidence of a violation in a
subsequent treble damage action.4" Although this provision was enacted
in the Clayton Act and, in itself, does not indicate any trend, a brief
discussion is included because of the important part that it plays in the
civil action.
Despite the limitations imposed pn the use of prior judgments,4
it is apparent that section 5 presents the plaintiff with a strong procedural
tool to implement his private suit; the prima fade evidence of a violation
shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence to the defendant
to show that the violation for which he was convicted was not the cause
Jan injury to the plaintiff. Therefore, the use of prior judgments saves
the plaintiff time and money which would be expended in procuring
the voluminous evidence required to establish a violation. While the
weight to be given to prior judgments may be disputed, it is dear, that the
bulk of private litigation has been and will continue to be based on section
5. If the trend in strengthening antitrust enforcement continues to
develop, it is quite possible that the suggestion might be adopted making
a prior judgment conclusive evidence of a defendant's violation."
39. Samuel Freedman v. Philadelphia Auction Co., 197 F. Supp. 849 (E.D.Pa.
1961). The court stated that the plaintiff had no automatic right to recover damages
without proof of loss even though a violation existed.
40. See Timberlake, The Use of Government Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent
Treble Damage Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, (1961).
41. See generally, Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010 (1951). It has been pointed out
that section 5 has limited application because in most criminal actions the defendant
pleads nolo contendere or submits to consent decrees. In addition, the plaintiff must
establish that he has sustained an injury as a result of the particular violation for
which the government judgment was entered against the defendant. Monticello Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 197 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815
(1952).
42. Loevinger, Private Actioni-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTImUST
BULL. 167 (1958).
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Proposed Reform. A treble damage judgment is a penalty on the
defendant; to argue otherwise seems to ignore reality. Therefore, the civil
action could be divided into two areas. The first area could include only
clear violations, with ,scienter as a requisite factor, and provide both
compensatory damages and punitive treble damages, plus costs and
reasonable attorney's fees, as now provided in the Clayton Act. The
second area could consist of cases in which scienter is not proven-i.e.
where only intent to commit the acts but not intent to violate the law is
proven. The latter situation is clearly an area in which the remedy should
be limited to compensation. In addition, the plaintiff could be allowed
to recover his costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
It is recognized that the two areas delineated are the opposite ex-
tremes with the majority of cases falling somewhere between these points.
In application, it may often be hard to determine whether a plaintiff
should be limited to compensation or should be allowed punitive damages
in addition. However, assuming that the proposed increased penal sanc-
tions are adopted,43 and assuming that they are able to provide the
requisite deterrent force, it may be that a plaintiff should be limited to
compensatory damages whenever the court is in doubt as to the existence
of scienter. Granting that such an application of the treble damage
provision would remove much of its deterrent effect, it would be more
reasonable than granting plaintiff's windfall profits from every violation
of the antitrust laws.
Conclusions: The importance of the treble damage action in the
antitrust law cannot be denied, and the courts which are aware of this
importance have done much to develop the treble damage action into a
potent tool of enforcement. Modifications in the requirement of certainty
in the proof of damages have gone a long way to ease a plaintiff's burden
of proof. In addition, procedural help has substantially aided the plaintiff
in establishing his right of recovery. Although the logic of the decision
may be questionable, the Hanover case points up the extreme position
that courts are willing to take in order to redress violations of the antitrust
laws, even though windfall gains to private plaintiffs sometimes result.
The discussion thus far shows some of the problems involved in
using judicial expansion to reach a desired policy goal. If the policy
behind the liberalizing of recovery under the antitrust laws is one of
providing a greater deterrent force, then legislation would seem to be
a more satisfactory means, rather than providing private claimants with
windfall profits.
43. S. 2252, S. 2253, S. 2254, H. 8137 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
NOTES
In spite of the language classifying the treble damage action as
compensatory, it is apparent that the underyling policy of protecting the
public has assumed a greater role of importance and is probably the
basic reason for the judicial trend. The reason for this trend is not
discernible from a consideration of the civil cases alone, however. A look
at the penal sanctions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts points up an
existing inadequacy which probably has influenced the courts in their
attempts to make recovery easier in the civil actions. Decisions such as
the Hanover case clearly show the need for penal reform.
PENAL SANCTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORM:
Basic Penal Provisions. The penal sanctions established in 1890
in the Sherman Act provided that violators "shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $5,000 or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."44 These provisions
remained unchanged for sixty-four years as the country grew and the
economy expanded. While the purchasing power of the dollar has de-
clined, total corporate assets have increased greatly.4 5
In comparison to the civil remedy of treble damages, the penal
sanctions did not enjoy the same growth. The inadequacy in the penal
sanctions was recognized by the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee in its study on the concentration of economic power, and recom-
mendations were made to Congress in 1941 to increase the sanctions.4
It was not until 1955, however, that the Senate Judiciary Committee
favorably reported a bill proposing an increase in the fine under the
Sherman Act to $50,000 in lieu of the then existing $5,000 fine.4 ' Al-
though there was some fear that increasing the fine would work a hard-
ship on the small businessman, the committee pointed out that only the
maximum ceiling on the fine was increased, and a court need not always
impose the maximum penalty. The Sherman Act was amended in 1955
to increase the maximum fine to $50,000.48
With the passing of time, the effectiveness of this increased fine
as a deterrent against violations of the antitrust laws has become ques-
tionable. A fine of $50,000, viewed in relation to the corporate assets
of many corporations, seems small. For example, if a fine of $50,000
44. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
45. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2322 (1955). from a sample of twenty-five
corporations, the assets increased from 3,883 million dollars in 1910, to 14,240 million
dollars in 1948.
46. T.N.E.C., 77th Cong. 1st Sess., Final Report and Recommendation of T.N.E.C.
3, 40 (1941).
47. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2322, 2323 (1955).
48. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
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were imposed upon a corporation with a capital and surplus of $50 million,
the fine would amount to approximately one-tenth of one percent-an
amount which such a corporation could treat as a "cost of doing business."
Proposed Increased Pendl Sanctions. Steps to correct the present
inadequacies of the penal sanctions have recently been taken by the
introduction in the Senate of three bills dealing with proposed reform."
Senate Bill 2252 would increase the basic fine from $50,000 to $100,000
for violations of sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act. In addition, a
new subsection to be added at the end of sections 1, 2 and 3 would provide
for a more severe penalty in the case of subsequent violations, imposing
a mandatory prison sentence in lieu of a permissive or alternative
imprisonment in the case of a natural person."0 Enactment of this bill
would result in a definite strengthening of the penal sanctions.
Another bilP1 would amend section 1 of the Sherman Act by dis-
tinguishing combinations or conspiracies in violation of the Act from
those growing out of (1) price fixing, and (2) the apportioning, allocat-
ing or dividing of any product market. For the latter two categories
the penalty would be a $500,000 fine in the case of a corporation, and a
$100,000 fine and a mandatory imprisonment not exceeding one year for
a natural person for a first violation.
A bill has also been introduced which would increase the penalties
for violations by directors, officers and agents of a corporation. 2 The
present law under section 14 of the Clayton Act provides that a violation
by a corporation shall be deemed to be that of the individual officers or
directors who "have authorized, ordered, or done any acts constituting
a violation," and provides for a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court.5" The proposed
legislation with respect to section 14 would increase the fine to $100,000.
Also, it would extend liability to violations ratified by such officers or
directors, with the failure of an officer or director to prevent or stop
a violation constituting ratification. In addition, it would provide for a
mandatory prison sentence in the case of a second violation, basing
liability on a "reasonable cause to believe" test, rather than scienter.
49. S. 2252, S. 2253, S. 2254 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
50. Provided, That after the conviction of any person of any violation of this
section committed after the enactment of this proviso, any conviction of that person for
a subsequent violation of this section committed within ten years after such previous
conviction shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $500,000 if that person is not a
natural person, and by a fine not exceeding $100,000 and by imprisonment not exceeding
one year if that person is a natural person. S. 2252, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
51. H. 8137, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
52. S. 2254, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
53. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1955).
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In comparison with the prior inaction of Congress in the penal
sanction area of the anti-trust laws, except for the 1955 amendment, the
enactment of these proposed amendments would constitute a large step
toward strengthening the deterrent force of the statutes. Although the
form and substance of the various proposals may be questioned, the
necessity of bringing the antitrust sanctions up to date cannot be denied.
As indicated earlier, the courts have been struggling to enforce the anti-
trust laws in civil cases since the penal sanctions have been ineffective.
Inequities which have previously arisen, such as windfall profits, need
not recur as a result of the use of penal instead of civil remedies to
effectuate the policy of law. 4
Evaluation and Criticism. The effect of the proposed legislation in
achieving the goal of providing a more adequate deterrent force is open
to conjecture. It would seem, however, that increased fines, increased
penalties for second violations and the mandatory prison sentences would
significantly affect the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Since the
increased fine for a first violator is only $100,000 in most instances, it
is possible that the civil action for treble damages would continue to be a
major factor in deterring future violations. A plaintiff who establishes
damages in the million dollar category, for example, provides a far greater
potential burden to the financial position of a corporation when these
damages are trebled than does a fine of $100,000 which could still be
considered a "cost of doing business." The fine could remain a calculated
risk that many large corporations would be willing to assume.
The most significant change proposed by the pending legislation is
the increased emphasis placed on the liability of the individuals of a
corporation who order, authorize or ratify a violation. As previously
pointed out, the new bill would provide for a mandatory imprisonment
of corporate officers under certain circumstances. Under existing legisla-
tion, where imprisonment is an alternative sanction to be imposed at the
discretion of the courts, this sanction is often ignored." This may be
explained, as one writer has noted, because, "the persons to whom criminal
prosecution is directed are almost invariably leading citizens in their
respective community and are men of unquestioned personal integ-
rity. . . . "" Although it may be true that very few prosecutions are
instituted against individuals, it does not necessarily follow that these
54. See generally, KAYSEN AND TURNFR, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN EcoNomlC ANID
LEGAL ANALYSIS 257-258 (1959).
55. See Kramer, Criminal Prosecution for Violations of the Sherman Act-In
Search of a Policy, 48 GEo. L.J. 530 (1960).
56. Id. at 536.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
persons do not deserve to be called criminals." The increased penalty
on individual corporate officers and directors may be able to accomplish
much more than either the fine or the treble damage action against the
corporate entity, since the person responsible may fear prison much more
than a monetary penalty.
Criticism may be properly directed to that part of Senate Bill 2254
which provides for the liability of corporate officers and directors where
they had "reasonable cause to believe" that a corporation was engaged
in, or about to engage in conduct amounting to a violation. Many times,
where a corporation has been found to be in violation of the antitrust
laws, it may not have been clear that it was a violation until a court of
law so decided. It may be easy to look back upon a violation and say
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a violation was being
committed, whereas it would have been very difficult for a corporate
officer to speculate as to whether or not his intended actions were un-
lawful. Removing scienter as an element of an antitrust violation may
tend to harm business in that officers and directors may become overly
cautious in areas which normally justify a speculative business venture.
In those areas the possibility of a violation might properly be treated as a
justified business risk, the cost of which should be borne by the industry.
It is not usually the policy of the law to hold a person criminally liable
unless he is proved to have intended to commit a criminal act, and statutes
defining criminal offenses without the element of scienter have been held
unconstitutional." It may be, however, that a subjective test of criminal
intent is an ideal almost incapable of achievement. A study by the
Temporary National Economic Committee indicated that the adoption
of a purely subjective test would be unwise considering the complicated
field of industrial integration.5"
Notwithstanding the need to enforce sanctions against individuals,
who, after all, are responsible for the acts of the corporation, it would
seem that the proposed legislation basing penal liability on the mere
negligence of such corporate officials is improper."0 Again there is a
need for a distinction between those violations which were clearly intended
57. Loevinger, Recent Developments hn Antitrust Enforcement, 6 ANTITRUST BULL.
3, 4 (Jan.-Feb. 1961).
58. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); See also 22 C.J.S. Crimilnal Law
§ 29 (1961). For a discussion and evaluation of objective liability, see HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLE OF CRIMINAL LAW 146-170 (2 Ed. 1960).
59. T.N.E.C., 76th Cong. 3rd Sess., Monograph 38, A Study of the Construction
and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws 1, 78 (1941). The committee reasoned
that antitrust laws should be concerned not with a state of mind but with economic
realities.
60. HALL, op. cit. supra note 58 at 167.
NOTES
or ratified, and those violations which were violations only after a trial
on the merits. Can it plausibly be argued that a jury, looking back on a
given set of facts, is in a better position to ascertain whether there were
"reasonable grounds to believe" that a violation was in existence or
about to happen than a business man who had many years of experience
in the field? It is obvious that the answer must be in the negative; yet
that is what would happen if an objective test of liability were established
for corporate officials. If individuals are to be subjected to more rigorous
penal sanctions, it may be necessary for Congress to dearly specify what
are violations, and to adequately define what is meant by "price fixing,"
and the phrase "apportioning, allocating or dividing any product market,"
for example." It is not suggested that such violations should escape all
liability. The violators should be liable to compensate persons who have
been damaged, but to also impose criminal liability in those cases would
seem to be unjust.
It is to be hoped that in the future the penal sanctions will assume
their rightful place in the prevention and punishment of violations, and
the civil action will be relegated to its original purpose of compensating
those who have been injured by violations.
TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL OF FRANCHISES UNDER
THE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS FRANCHISE ACT
Automobile retail distribution through the use of franchise agree-
ments has expanded greatly in the last fifty years.' This growth2 has
brought with it conflicts and tensions.' The bargaining strength of the
manufacturer4 reached such proportions' that the franchise relationship
61. S. 2253, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. (1961).
1. For a general discussion of dealer franchise agreements see Note, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 1010 (1950); DAVISSON, MARKETING CHANNELS FOR MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS 83,
104-106 (Clewett ed. 1954).
2. The emergence of the manufacturer as the dominant party in the franchise
relationship is discussed in HEwITT, AUTOmOBILE DEALER FRANCHISES (1956).
3. See Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956).
4. In 1954, the automobile industry turned out a total of 9,177,919 cars and trucks.
Its investment was 7-1/3 billion dollars. See generally Hearings Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
1119 (1956).
5. In terms of total economic investment the difference between the manufacturing
industry and those engaged in distribution is not too great. In 1954, the total investment
of the 42,000 franchise dealers was about five billion dollars. The superior bargaining
position of the manufacturer is apparent when the assets of one manufacturer are com-
pared with those of a single dealer. For example in 1955 General Motors had assets
